a moment - Grosz on Deleuze, Bergson and the concept of Life

"All forms of life share this protraction of the past into present, and the retroaction of the present on the past, through the capacity to reorient chemical and physical processes" - Elizabeth Grosz 2007

I still question why Deleuze dismisses lived experience as if it was itself stabley identifiable only as Kantian base of stable identity. Differentiated and relational experience is a thing. For Bergson there are relationalities, nothing is disconnected to the external. Grosz evokes metaphor of the tentacle. The emphasis on the past tells me: one Bergson might have lost his debate to Einstein due to Minkowski space (apparently you can put a stick in a flowing river and you can see a counterflow as if predecessing, don't @ me) two that the generative past is the preindividuated as mentioned by Georges Simondon. Simondon maintains we can have no stasis like objects do. Just to differentiate between organic and inorganic life. I want to introduce the concept of the glass man delusion from the history of madness. Is madness as such inorganic phenomenology? I recall Artaud BwO but at its more collisional. Orthogonalising anatomical socialisation as differentiation. and three, life where sensory memories (temporal, muscular, visual, spatial etc) can retrocause bilaterally. Where relating and the memory can be embodied transference of chimeric identity. Jsuis l'autre

a brief response to essay